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Abstract
We provide a revealed preference analysis of the transferable utility hypothesis,
which is widely used in economic models. First, we establish revealed preference
conditions that must be satised for observed group behavior to be consistent with
Pareto eciency under transferable utility. Next, we show that these conditions
are easily testable by means of integer programming methods. The tests are entirely
nonparametric, which makes them robust with respect to specication errors. Finally,
we demonstrate the practical usefulness of our conditions by means of an application
to Spanish consumption data. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst empirical
test of the transferable utility hypothesis.
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11 Introduction
The transferable utility hypothesis plays a crucial role in many economic models. However,
the hypothesis is generally conceived as a strong one: it imposes severe restrictions on the
underlying utility functions. From this perspective it is somewhat surprising to note that
-up till now- the testable implications of transferable utility have hardly received attention
in the literature. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, the hypothesis has never been
tested on observational data.
This paper lls this gap: we develop tools for investigating the empirical realism of the
(theoretically appealing) transferable utility hypothesis. More specically, we establish re-
vealed preference conditions for observed consumption behavior to be consistent with the
transferable utility assumption under Pareto ecient group behavior. These conditions are
easily testable as they only require observations on consumed quantities at the group level
and corresponding prices; testing the conditions can use standard integer programming
methods. In addition, the tests are entirely nonparametric, i.e. their empirical implemen-
tation does not require a prior (typically nonveriable) functional structure for the utility
functions of the individuals in the group. We demonstrate the practical usefulness of the
conditions by means of an empirical application to a Spanish household consumption data
set. This provides a rst empirical test of the transferable utility hypothesis.
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2, we motivate our research
question by a brief review of the relevant literature, and we articulate our own contribu-
tion. Here we will also indicate that the so-called generalized quasi-linear (GQL) utility
specication is the most general specication under which a Pareto optimal allocation rule
is consistent with the assumption of transferable utility. In Section 3, we then formally
dene this GQL specication. Section 4 subsequently presents the corresponding revealed
preference characterization. Section 5 provides the integer programming formulation of
our characterization and presents the empirical application. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review and own contribution
The popularity of transferable utility. The transferable utility hypothesis states
that it is possible to transfer utility from one person in a group to another person in a
lossless manner, i.e. without aecting the aggregate utility of the group. This hypothesis
is pervasive in many areas of economics. For example, in cooperative game theory the
hypothesis is used to determine the value of a coalition and underlies notions such as the
Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), the kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965) and the nucleolus
(Schmeidler, 1969). Next, it is a critical assumption in the Shapley-Shubik assignment
model (Shapley and Shubik, 1972), which has become a workhorse in the study of labor
and marriage markets and other models of two-sided matching. Furthermore, transferable
utility is crucial for the validity of well known theoretical results such as the Coase theorem
and Becker's Rotten Kid theorem (see Coase (1960) and Becker (1974); Hurwicz (1995)
and Bergstrom (1989) discuss the importance of the transferability hypothesis for these
2theoretical results). Lastly, the hypothesis is also frequently used in principle agent models,
theoretical mechanism design, matching models, public economics, industrial organization,
international trade, household economics, and so on.1
The transferable utility assumption is popular because it has several highly desirable
implications. First of all, it guarantees that group demand behavior displays attractive
aggregation properties. In particular, any group of individuals then satises the represen-
tative agent framework: aggregated demand functions behave as if they were generated by
a single individual. Next, the transferable utility hypothesis considerably facilitates wel-
fare analysis. As the distribution of utility over the dierent members of the group does
not inuence the nal outcome, welfare analysis can focus exclusively on the aggregate
utility/welfare. As such, utilizing the transferable utility hypothesis for both theoretical
and empirical model building makes life of many economists a lot easier. Nevertheless,
despite its wide prevalence in economic models, the empirical implications of transferable
utility have hardly been studied.
Testable (dierential) implications of transferable utility. To dene the testable
implications of transferable utility at the group level, we need to characterize the underlying
utility functions of the individuals within the group. The best-known specication leading
to the property of transferable utility is the quasi-linear (QL) utility specication. This
specication requires the utility functions of the individuals to be linear in at least one
good, usually called the numeraire. Unfortunately, QL utility has strong and unrealistic
implications (e.g. absence of income eects for all but a single good, risk neutrality, etc.).
In this respect, we also note that QL utility will be strongly rejected in our empirical
application that we present below.
In the presence of public goods, Bergstrom and Cornes (1981, 1983) and Bergstrom
(1989) showed that a weaker form than QL utility equally implies transferable utility,
i.e. so-called `generalized' quasi-linear (GQL) utility (a term coined by Chiappori (2010)).
Interestingly, these authors also showed that this GQL specication is the most general
specication that allows for transferable utility. The GQL form can be obtained from the
QL specication through multiplication of the numeraire by a function dened in terms of
the bundle of public goods. The additional requirement that this function is common to
all individuals within the group provides the property of transferable utility.
Recently, Chiappori (2010) derived a set of necessary and sucient conditions on the
aggregate demand function such that it is compatible with a Pareto ecient allocation
where group members are endowed with GQL utility functions. As far as we know, this is
the rst (and {up till now{ sole) study that makes the testable implications of transferable
utility explicit. In view of our following exposition, we remark that Chiappori adopted
a so-called `dierential' approach to characterizing GQL utility: he focused on testable
(dierential) properties of the group demand function to be consistent with transferable
utility. Practical applications of this dierential approach then typically require a prior
1See, for example, Bergstrom (1997) for an extensive review of applications of the transferable utility
hypothesis in household economics.
3parametric specication of this demand function, which is to be estimated from the data.
As we will indicate below, this implies a most notable dierence with the approach that
we follow here.
Revealed preference implications. We complement Chiappori's ndings by establish-
ing testable conditions of transferable utility (or GQL utility) in the revealed preference
tradition of Samuelson (1938), Houthakker (1950), Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) and Var-
ian (1982). In contrast to the dierential approach, this revealed preference approach
obtains conditions that can be veried by (only) using a nite set of group consumption
observations (i.e. prices and quantities) and, thus, it does not require the estimation of a
group demand function. As such, a main advantage of these revealed preference conditions
is that they are entirely nonparametric: they do not impose any functional form on the
utility function (generating a particular group demand function) except for usual regularity
conditions.
More specically, we get necessary and sucient conditions that enable checking consis-
tency of a given data set with transferable utility. In the spirit of Varian (1982), we refer to
this as `testing' data consistency with transferable utility.2 As for the practical application
of these tests, we will show that our revealed preference conditions can be equivalently
reformulated as integer programming constraints. This integer programming formulation
allows us to test data consistency with transferable utility by applying standard integer
programming solution techniques.3
Further contributions. At this point, it is worth to indicate two further important
dierences between our study and the original study of Chiappori (2010), which involve
two additional contributions. First, to establish his characterization, Chiappori assumed
observability of the numeraire good. However, in practice this numeraire good is typically
an `outside' good, i.e. the amount of money not spent on (observed) consumption, which
is usually not observed in real-life applications (including our own application). Given
this, our following revealed preference analysis will principally focus on characterizing
transferable utility for the case with an unobserved numeraire (or outside good). To obtain
this characterization, we will rst have to establish the characterization that applies to an
observed numeraire.
Another main dierence between our study and the one of Chiappori is that we present
an empirical application that eectively brings our testable implications to observational
data. As indicated above, as far as we know, this provides a rst empirical test of the
2As is standard in the revealed preference literature, the type of tests that we consider here are `sharp'
tests; either a data set satises the data consistency conditions or it does not. In this respect, the
literature does suggest methodological extensions to account for measurement error and optimization
error in revealed preference tests (see, for example, Varian (1985, 1990)). For compactness, we will not
include these (straightforward) extensions in our following analysis.
3A similar integer programming approach has been fruitfully applied for revealed preference analysis of
multi-person consumption behavior. See, for example, Cherchye, Demuynck, and De Rock (2009, 2011b)
and Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2011a).
4transferable utility hypothesis. Specically, we verify our revealed preference conditions
for a sample of households drawn from the Encuesta Continua De Presupestos Familiares
(ECPF), a Spanish consumer expenditure survey. In general, our results are mixed. Al-
though we nd the assumption of transferable utility to be realistic for a considerable part
of the households under consideration, there is also a substantial share of households whose
behavior contradicts the transferable utility assumption. As we will discuss, one possible
explanation is that the appropriateness of the transferable utility hypothesis depends on
the specic household (characteristics) at hand. Following this interpretation, it may ef-
fectively make sense to assume transferable utility for particular categories of households.
As a nal remark, we indicate that Brown and Calsamiglia (2007) recently developed
a revealed preference characterization of the QL utility specication. By focusing on the
GQL utility form, we provide revealed preference conditions for a model that contains
this QL specication as a special case. We will explicitly discuss the nested nature of the
two utility specications when introducing our revealed preference characterization; this
will show that, for the special case of QL utility, our (GQL) revealed preference conditions
reduce to the conditions of Brown and Calsamiglia. In addition, in our empirical exercise we
will compare the empirical goodness of the GQL and QL specications. A main conclusion
here will be that many households violate QL utility but are consistent with GQL utility.
In other words, at least for this application GQL utility appears to be a considerably more
realistic assumption than QL utility.
3 Generalized quasi-linear utility
Consider a group with M ( 2) members. Each member m ( M) consumes a bundle
of 1 + N private goods (qm;xm) 2 R
N+1
+ and a bundle of K public goods Q 2 RK
+. The
private good xm denotes member m's amount of the numeraire. For each m, we assume
xm > 0 in what follows. In addition, we normalize by setting the price of the numeraire
equal to one. Next, the vector p 2 RN
++ represents the normalized price vector for the
bundle of private goods qm, while the vector P 2 RK
++ is the normalized price vector for
the bundle of public goods Q.
Utility for member m is represented by the strictly increasing and quasi-concave utility
function um(qm;xm;Q). The utility functions um are said to be of the generalized quasi-
linear (GQL) form if there exist a (member-specic) function bm : R
K+N
+ ! R and a
(common) function a : RK








Bergstrom and Cornes (1983) have shown that this GQL utility function is the most general
functional form that still allows for transferable utility.
The GQL specication encompasses the quasi-linear (QL) specication as a special
case. Specically, if a(Q) = a for all Q (i.e. the function value a(Q) is everywhere the








5However, if a(Q) varies with the level of public goods, then the GQL specication vastly
expands the range of utility functions compatible with transferable utility.
We assume that group decisions are made according to the Pareto criterion: allocations
are chosen such that no member can be made better of without reducing the utility of some
other group member. In this case, any equilibrium allocation (q1;:::;qM;x1;:::;xM;Q)
minimizes total group expenditures subject to the constraint that every member of the
group receives at least some predened level of utility  um. In other words, given a xed
vector of utility levels ( u1;:::;  uM) 2 RM
+ , Pareto eciency imposes that the group decision
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m (8m  M):
In view of our following analysis, we develop an equivalent formulation of OP.1. To
obtain the formulation, we rst observe that each constraint will be binding in the solution
of OP.1 because the utility functions um are strictly increasing. Using this, and because
xm > 0 for all m, we can substitute the restrictions in the objective function. As a result,


























From this equivalent formulation, it is directly clear that the optimal solution of prob-
lem OP.1 only depends on the total amount of utility
PM
m  um but not on the specic
distribution of this amount over the dierent group members. This demonstrates the
property of transferable utility under GQL.
Standard rst order conditions characterize the (interior) solutions of problem OP.2 if
the function  is convex and the function m is concave. Bergstrom and Cornes (1983)
showed that these requirements are equivalent to the condition that the utility functions um
are quasi-concave (which we assumed before). Next, it is easy to verify that  is decreasing
in Q while m is increasing in q. In what follows, we will further assume that the function
m is also increasing in Q; this condition is sucient for um to be increasing in Q.
For an optimal solution (q1;:::;qM;x1;:::;xM;Q) of problem OP.2, the rst order






















Conditions (foc.1) and (foc.2) provide a formal expression of the group's marginal decision
rules for the public and private goods, respectively. Next, condition (foc.3) complies with
the GQL utility specication in (1). The rst order conditions (foc.1)-(foc.3) provide a
useful starting point for developing our revealed preference characterization in the next
section.
4 Revealed preference characterization
We will empirically analyze the aggregate consumption behavior of a group with M indi-
viduals, by starting from a nite set of T observed group choices. For each observation
t 2 T, we know the privately and publicly consumed quantities qt and Qt, as well as the
corresponding prices pt and Pt. (Remark that we only observe the aggregate private quan-
tities qt and not the member-specic quantities qm
t .) In a rst instance we assume that
the aggregate amount of the numeraire (`outside') good at every t (i.e. xt) is also observed.
Later on we will relax this assumption. As discussed before, we believe an unobserved
numeraire is the more realistic assumption for real life applications.
Numeraire observed. If the consumption of the numeraire is observed, we obtain the
data set S = fpt;Pt;xt;qt;Qtgt2T. In what follows, we present necessary and sucient
conditions for the set S to be rationalizable in terms of GQL utility functions, i.e. there
exist functions  and m so that each bundle (xt;qt;Qt) (t 2 T) leads to a solution for
OP.2. This provides a characterization of transferable utility in the revealed preference
tradition. Our starting denition is the following:
Denition 1 (TU-rationalizable) The data set S = fpt;Pt;xt;qt;Qtgt2T is transfer-
able utility (TU)-rationalizable if (i) there exist a convex and decreasing function
 : RK
+ ! R and M concave and increasing functions m : R
N+M
+ ! RN and (ii), for each
t, there exist private consumption bundles q1
t;:::;qM
t that sum to qt and strictly positive
numbers x1
t;:::;xM
t that sum to xt such that fq1
t;:::;qM
t ;Qtg solves OP.2 given the prices










Of course, the above denition could equally well have been stated by using the func-
tions a and bm and by referring to program OP.1. We opt for the current statement to
enhance the interpretation of the revealed preference characterization below.
7It follows from Denition 1 that the concept of TU-rationalizability implicitly depends
on the number M of individuals within the group. However, as the following result shows,
this qualication is actually irrelevant in view of practical applications: it is empirically
impossible to distinguish between dierent group sizes; there exists a rationalization of the
set S in terms of a single individual (i.e. M = 1) if and only if there exists one in terms of
any number M of individuals. More specically, we can prove the following result:4
Proposition 1 Consider a data set S = fpt;Pt;xt;qt;Qtgt2T. The following statements
are equivalent:
1. The data set S is TU-rationalizable for a group of M individuals;
2. The data set S is TU-rationalizable for a group of a single individual;






++ such that, for all
t;v 2 T:
t   v  

v(Qt   Qv); (RP.1)
t   v  pv(qt   qv) + 














The equivalence between statements 1 and 2 demonstrates the aggregation property
of the transferable utility assumption that we mentioned above: if a data set is TU-
rationalizable for a group of M individuals, then it is rationalizable for a single individ-
ual (endowed with a GQL utility function), and vice versa.5 Statement 3 then provides
the combinatorial conditions that characterize the collection of data sets that are TU-
rationalizable. The rst two conditions ((RP.1) and (RP.2)) dene so-called Afriat in-
equalities (see also our discussion of Afriat's Theorem in Appendix B) that apply to our
specic setting; in terms of Denition 1 these inequalities correspond to, respectively, the
(convex) function  and the (concave) function  (where we drop the index m because





the gradient vectors of these functions in terms of the public goods bundle. Finally, the
conditions (RP.3) and (RP.4) give the revealed preference counterparts of the rst order
conditions (foc.1) and (foc.3) that we discussed in the previous section.
Numeraire unobserved. In real life applications the amount of the numeraire good is
usually not observed. For example, this will also be the case in our own application. The
relevant data set is then given as S = fpt;Pt;qt;Qtgt2T.
Interestingly, the result in Proposition 1 enables us to derive a characterization of
transferable utility for such a data set S. Specically, we can derive the following result:
4Appendix A contains the proofs of our main results.
5Chiappori (2010) obtained a similar result in his dierential setting.
8Proposition 2 Consider a data set S = fpt;Pt;qt;Qtgt2T. The following statements are
equivalent:
1. For each t 2 T, there exist xt 2 R++ such that fpt;Pt;xt;qt;Qtgt2T is TU-rationalizable
for a group of M individuals (or, equivalently, a single individual);
2. For all t 2 T, there exist UA
t ;UB
t 2 R+, A























v  pv(qt   qv) + ~ P
B
v (Qt   Qv); (RP.6)
~ P
A
t + ~ P
B
t = Pt: (RP.7)
When compared to the characterization in Proposition 1, the conditions (RP.5), (RP.6)
and (RP.7) in Proposition 2 correspond to (RP.1), (RP.2) and (RP.3), respectively. We
refer to the proof of the result for an explicit construction. This proof also shows that, for
each observation t, we can always construct a numeraire quantity xt that meets condition
(RP.4) if the data satisfy (RP.5)-(RP.7).
One important note pertains to the fact that condition (RP.5), which contains Afriat
inequalities, is nonlinear in terms of the unknown 's and ~ PA's. From a practical point
of view, this nonlinearity makes it dicult to empirically verify the characterization in
Proposition 2. However, in the next section we will show that it is possible to equiva-
lently reformulate the conditions (RP.5)-(RP.7) as integer programming constraints. As
such, we can use standard integer programming solution methods for verifying transferable
utility. Our empirical application will demonstrate the practical usefulness of this integer
programming approach.
Special case: QL rationalizability. As a concluding exercise, we show that our char-
acterization of GQL utility nests the revealed preference characterization of QL utility that
was developed by Brown and Calsamiglia (2007, Theorem 2.2). To see this, we recall from
the previous section that QL utility imposes that the function value (Q) is constant for all
Q. In terms of the characterization in Proposition 1, this means that the gradient vector


t equals zero. And, thus, (RP.1)-(RP.4) reduce to
t   v  pt(qt   qv) + Pt(Qt   Qv); (RP.8)
which exactly obtains the revealed preference conditions originally provided by Brown and
Calsamiglia. We also observe that the QL condition (RP.8) is independent of the level for
the numeraire (xt), which implies a notable dierence with our above characterization of
GQL utility. In fact, this independence is also revealed by the fact that the conditions
(RP.5)-(RP.7) in Proposition 2 equally coincide with (RP.8) if we set ~ PA
t equal to zero for
all t 2 T (which has a similar meaning as 

t = 0 in Proposition 1).
95 Empirical Application
In this section, we will use the above revealed preference characterization to empirically
assess the validity of the transferable utility hypothesis for Spanish household data. As
discussed in Section 2, the transferable utility hypothesis has often been used in a (the-
oretical) household context, which -in our opinion- makes this an interesting application
area for demonstrating the practical usefulness of our empirical characterization. In our
application, a main focus will be on comparing the performance of the GQL and QL utility
specications. As we motivated before, we will concentrate on the case where the quan-
tity of the numeraire good is not observed. Before presenting our data and results, we
rst introduce the integer programming formulation of the conditions (RP.5)-(RP.7) in
Proposition 2.
Integer programming formulation. As indicated above, the conditions (RP.6) and
(RP.7) in Proposition 2 are linear and hence easily veriable, while the Afriat inequalities
in condition (RP.5) are nonlinear. However, these Afriat inequalities can be equivalently
restated in terms of integer programming constraints by making use of the Generalized Ax-
iom of Revealed Preferences (GARP); this follows from Afriat's Theorem that we recapture
in Appendix B.
Let us consider a general setting with a set Z = fwl;xlgl2L containing (strictly positive)
price vectors wl and (positive) quantity vectors xl. Then the GARP condition is as follows:
Denition 2 Consider a set Z = fwl;xlgl2L with wl 2 RK
++ and xl 2 RK
+. For any
l1;l2 2 L, xl1Rxl2 if wl1xl1  wl1xl2. Next, xl1Rxl2 if there exists a sequence r;:::;t (with
r;:::;t 2 L) such that xl1Rxr,...,xtRxl2. The set Z satises GARP if, for all l1;l2 2 L,
xl1Rxl2 implies wl2xl1  wl2xl2. We refer to R as a revealed preference relation.
We then have the following proposition, which makes use of the binary variables rt;v.
Proposition 3 Consider a data set S = fpt;Pt;qt;Qtgt2T. The following statements are
equivalent:
1. For each t 2 T, there exist xt 2 R++ such that fpt;Pt;xt;qt;Qtgt2T is TU-rationalizable
for a group of M individuals (or, equivalently, a single individual);
2. For all t;v 2 T, there exist rt;v 2 f0;1g;UA
t ;UB










v  pv(qt   qv) + ~ P
B
v (Qt   Qv); (IP.1)
~ P
A
t + ~ P
B
t = Pt; (IP.2)
~ P
A
t (Qt   Qv) < rt;vPtQt; (IP.3)
rt;v + rv;s  1 + rt;s; (IP.4)
~ P
A
t (Qt   Qv)  (1   rv;t)PtQt: (IP.5)
10The linear inequalities (IP.1) and (IP.2) are clearly identical to (RP.6) and (RP.7). The
nonlinear inequalities (RP.5) are replaced by the linear inequalities (IP.3)-(IP.5) that make
use of real and integer variables. More specically, (IP.3)-(IP.5) correspond to the GARP
condition in Denition 2 in which we take wl = ~ PA
l and xl = Ql.
To explain the inequalities (IP.3)-(IP.5), we interpret the variables rt;v in terms of the
revealed preference relation R, i.e. rt;v = 1 corresponds to QtRQv. The constraint (IP.3)
then imposes QtRQv (or rt;v = 1) whenever ~ PA
t Qt  ~ PA
t Qv. Next, the constraint (IP.4)
complies with transitivity of the relation R: if QtRQv (rt;v = 1) and QvRQs (rv;s = 1),
then QtRQs (rt;s = 1). Finally, the constraint (IP.5) states that, if QvRQt (rv;t = 1), then
we must have ~ PA
t Qt  ~ PA
t Qv.
For a given data set S, we can verify the above linear inequalities by using mixed integer
linear programming techniques. Given the result in Proposition 3, this eectively checks
whether the set S is consistent with transferable utility (i.e. rationalizable in terms of GQL
utility functions).
Application set-up. Our data are drawn from the Encuesta Continua de Presupestos
Familiares (ECPF). The ECPF is a quarterly budget survey (1985{1997) that interviews
about 3200 Spanish households on their consumption expenditures. For each household,
the data provides consumption observations for a maximum of eight consecutive quarters.
See Browning and Collado (2001) and Crawford (2010) for a more detailed explanation of
this data set.
For obvious reasons, we focus on households with at least two household members.
Next, all households in our sample are headed by a married couple where the husband is
full time employed and the wife is outside the labor force. Finally, we exclude all households
with less then eight observations. In the end, this obtains a panel with 1585 households.
For each household, we have consumption data (quantities and prices) for 15 nondurable
consumption goods: (i) food and non-alcoholic drinks at home; (ii) alcohol; (iii) tobacco;
(iv) energy at home (heating by electricity); (v) services at home (heating: not electricity,
water, furniture repair); (vi) nondurables at home (cleaning products); (vii) non-durable
medicines; (viii) medical services; (ix) transportation; (x) petrol; (xi) leisure (cinema,
theatre, clubs for sports); (xii) personal services; (xiii) personal nondurables (toothpaste,
soap); (xiv) restaurants and bars and (xv) traveling (holiday). We will treat energy at
home, services at home and nondurables at home as our three public goods. To obtain
normalized prices, we deate the price (index) for each good (category) by the value of the
consumer price index in the corresponding quarter.
To avoid (debatable) preference homogeneity assumptions across similar households,
we will consider each household separately in our following analysis. In other words, we
consider a dierent data set S = fpt; Pt; qt; Qtgt2T for every individual household. This
practice eectively accounts for inter-household heterogeneity and, thus, optimally exploits
the panel structure of our data set.
As mentioned above, we will mainly concentrate on comparing the empirical validity
of the GQL and QL utility specications, of which the rationalizability conditions have
11been given in Section 4. Next, as a further base of comparison, we will also check for each
household-specic data set S whether it satises GARP. As explained more formally in
Appendix B, such GARP consistency is equivalent to rationalizability in terms of some
(possibly non-(G)QL) utility function. Because the GARP condition is most frequently
considered in empirical applications of revealed preference analysis, we feel this provides
a useful benchmark for evaluating the (G)QL specications that form the central focus of
our analysis. In fact, this GARP test can be given a specic interpretation in our setting:
because we do not explicitly use information on the numeraire good, consistency of S with
GARP eectively constitutes a necessary and sucient condition for rationalizability in
terms of a utility function U that is separable in the bundle (q;Q) and the numeraire
quantity x, i.e. U(q;Q;x) = U(v(q;Q);x).6
Empirical results: pass rates and power. In what follows, we do not only consider
the mere test results but also the discriminatory power of the three (GQL, QL and GARP)
rationalizability conditions under study. Indeed, Bronars (1987) and, more recently, An-
dreoni and Harbaugh (2008) and Beatty and Crawford (2011) -rather convincingly- argue
that revealed preference test results (indicating pass or fail of the data for some behav-
ioral condition) should be complemented with power measures to obtain a fair empirical
assessment of the condition under evaluation. Indeed, favorable test results (i.e. a high
pass rate for some given data), which prima facie suggest a good empirical t, have little
value if the test has little discriminatory power (i.e. the condition is hard to reject for the
data at hand).
For each of the three rationalizability conditions under evaluation, we compute a power
measure for every individual household. This measure quanties discriminatory power in
terms of the probability to detect random behavior, and is constructed as follows. We model
random behavior by using a bootstrap procedure: we simulate 1000 random series of eight
consumption choices by constructing, for each of the eight observed household budgets, a
random quantity bundle exhausting the given budget (for the corresponding prices). We
construct these quantity bundles by randomly drawing (with replacement) budget shares
(for the 15 goods) from the set of 12680 (= 8 x 1585) observed household choices in our data
set. The power measure is then calculated as one minus the proportion of these randomly
generated consumption series that are consistent with the rationalizability condition under
evaluation. By using this bootstrap method, our power assessment gives information on the
expected distribution of violations under random choice, while incorporating information
on the households' actual choices.7
Table 1 presents our results. The rst column in the table gives the pass rates for the
6Observe that this is not equivalent to testing rationalizability in terms of a general (possibly non-
separable) utility function U. Indeed, as shown by Varian (1988), as soon as we do not observe the
consumption quantity of some good (in casu the numeraire quantity xt), then there always exists some
utility function that rationalizes observed behavior (i.e. we can always construct xt with price equal to
one) such that the resulting set fpt; Pt; xt; qt; Qtgt2T satises GARP).
7We refer to Bronars (1987) and Andreoni and Harbaugh (2008) for a general discussion on alternative
procedures to evaluate power in the context of revealed preference tests such as ours.
12Table 1: Pass rates and power
condition pass rate power
mean min 1st quartile median 3rd quartile max
GARP 0.903 0.115 0.000 0.008 0.066 0.210 0.628
QL 0 1 0.998 1 1 1 1
GQL 0.451 0.4121 0.107 0.264 0.465 0.531 0.673
three rationalizability conditions. Each pass rate gives the proportion of households in our
sample that meets a particular (GQL, QL or GARP) condition. A rst observation is that
the GARP condition provides a very good t of the data: more than 90% of the households
pass GARP, which means that their behavior can be rationalized by a separable utility
function as dened above. Not surprisingly, the stringent GQL condition does worse.
Still, we nd that about half of all households (i.e. 45%) are consistent with the GQL
specication. For these households, we cannot reject the transferable utility hypothesis.
Finally, the QL utility specication appears to be overly stringent for the current data set:
not a single household passes the corresponding rationalizability condition.
The remaining columns of Table 1 report on the power distribution for the three ra-
tionalizability tests. First, for the QL specication we obtain that the power distribution
is almost entirely centered around unity, which reveals a (nearly) 100% probability of re-
jecting random behavior for each individual household. At this point, we note that this
high power should not be too surprising given our previous nding that the QL condition
is rejected for every household in our sample. Next, if we compare the power distribu-
tions for the GQL and GARP conditions, we observe that the discriminatory power is
rather substantially higher for the GQL test than for the GARP test. Figure 1 provides
corresponding kernel estimations of the GARP and GQL power distributions. A notable
observation is that the distribution for the GQL setting is bimodal with peaks around 0.15
and 0.5. Overall, Figure 1 conrms the general picture described before (based on Table
1), i.e. the GQL test is considerably more powerful than the GARP test.
As an additional investigation, we consider two additional power distributions for the
GARP and GQL tests. Specically, for each test we compare the power distribution for
the group of households that pass the test (pass group) with the one for the group of
households that fail the test (fail group). Table 2 gives the results. As a rst observation,
we nd an obvious trade-o between power and pass rate for the GARP test: the power
distribution for the fail group clearly dominates the distribution for the pass group. This
suggests that a household passing the GARP test is generally characterized by a lower
power for this test than a household that fails the GARP test. Interestingly, this trade-o
seems to be less prevalent for the GQL test: in this case, the dierence between the power
distributions for the pass and fail groups is far less pronounced.
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Table 2: power for pass and fail groups
condition group power
mean min 1st quartile median 3rd quartile max
GARP pass 0.102 0 0.06 0.048 0.186 0.628
fail 0.241 0.002 0.156 0.225 0.318 0.617
GQL pass 0.364 0.107 0.178 0.406 0.511 0.656
fail 0.451 0.109 0.404 0.489 0.549 0.673
14Table 3: Predictive success
condition mean min 1st quartile median 3rd quartile max
GARP 0.018 -0.998 0.001 0.034 0.163 0.628
QL 0 -0.002 0 0 0 0
GQL -0.136 -0.891 -0.523 -0.396 0.375 0.656
Empirical results: predictive success. As a nal exercise, we compute a predictive
success measure for the three conditions that we study, which was recently introduced by
Beatty and Crawford (2011) and is based on an original proposal of Selten (1991). The
measure combines the pass rate and power of a particular behavioral condition into a single
metric: for each household, it subtracts 1 minus the power measure from the pass measure
(1 or 0). As such, the measure is always situated between -1 and 1. Generally, a higher
predictive success value then reveals a better empirical performance of the behavioral con-
dition that is subject to testing. More specically, a predictive success value that is close to
-1 pertains to a household that fails the rationalizability condition (i.e. pass measure equals
0) even though the power of the test is low (i.e. close to 0). Conversely, a predictive success
value close to 1 indicates a household that passes the condition (i.e. pass measure equals
1) in a situation where this condition has high power (i.e. close to 1). Finally, a predictive
success value that equals exactly zero means that the condition is not informative for the
household at hand: the condition does not perform any better than the (uninformative)
assumption that households exhibit random consumption behavior (for which the power is
0 and the pass measure equals 1, by construction). For a given household, we will use this
zero value as a natural threshold value to identify a rationalizability condition as a `bad'
condition (if predictive success is below zero) or a `good' condition (if predictive success is
above zero).
Table 3 gives summary statistics for the predictive success measures that are relevant
for our exercise. These statistics tell us about the empirical performance of the three
rationalizability conditions at the aggregate level of our sample (with 1585 households).
As a rst observation, we note that the distribution is centered around zero for the QL
condition, with (almost) no variation across observations. In fact, we could have expected
this result on the basis of the 0% pass rate and (nearly) 100% power results that we
presented before. Given the above, this suggests that the QL condition is not informative
for the data at hand. By contrast, the pattern seems to be more indicative for the GARP
and GQL conditions. Like for the QL condition, we again get that the mean predictive
success score is close to zero, but now there is more variation across households.
To provide a better view of this cross-household variation, Figure 2 depicts estimations
of the predictive success distributions for the GQL and GARP conditions. Interestingly, the
gure reveals very dierent pictures for the two conditions. First, for the GARP condition
the distribution is largely centered around zero, with a rather limited variation. This
suggests that predictive success is (close to) zero for many households in our sample. Like
before, we interpret that for these households the GARP condition is not really informative.
15However, for a few households the data do allow us to identify GARP as a `good' or `bad'
behavioral condition (i.e. predictive success is substantially dierent from zero).
Next, for the GQL condition the predictive success distribution exhibits a clear bimodal
pattern: it achieves a rst peak around -0.55 and a second peak around 0.5. In our opinion,
this bimodality suggests a particular split-up of our original sample of households: for a
substantial group of households the GQL condition can be identied empirically as a `good'
one, whereas it is a rather `bad' condition for the remaining households. In turn, this
indicates that the adequacy of the GQL condition may depend on the specic household
(characteristics) at hand. In this respect, we have compared observable characteristics (in
our data set) for two household groups, i.e. households with predictive success above zero
(for which GQL is a `good' condition) and households with predictive success below zero
(for which GQL is a `bad' condition). We considered the following characteristics: age
of the household head, number of household members, specialized worker occupation and
home ownership. However, we found no statistical dierences between the two subsamples.
Therefore, we tentatively conclude that other (unobserved) household characteristics drive
the adequacy of the GQL condition, but further research is needed here.
Figure 2: Predictive success







What do we learn from all this? A rst conclusion is that, from an empirical point
of view, the GQL specication is more useful than the QL specication, which is strongly
rejected for our data. In fact, for a considerable subset of households the GQL speci-
cation performs rather well empirically; the adequacy of the specication may depend on
specic household characteristics (but our data did not allow us to identify which charac-
teristics). For these households, the GQL condition may help to obtain an analysis that
is substantially more powerful than the more standard GARP-based analysis. Because
the GQL utility specication is the most general specication that is consistent with the
16assumption of transferable utility, our ndings also shed light on the empirical validity of
this (theoretically attractive) transferable utility hypothesis. It directly follows that this
may eectively constitute a good hypothesis for particular classes of households (but it
may also be a rather bad one for other households). At a more general level, we believe
that our application convincingly shows the practical usefulness of our revealed preference
characterization for assessing the validity of transferable utility (or GQL utility) in real life
settings.
6 Conclusion
We have presented revealed preference conditions that must be satised by observed be-
havior to be consistent with transferable utility (or GQL utility) under Pareto eciency.
These conditions are easily veried by using mixed integer linear programming techniques,
which is attractive from a practical point of view. This provides an easy-to-apply frame-
work for evaluating the empirical realism of the transferable utility hypothesis in real life
settings.
We have demonstrated the usefulness of our revealed preference framework by an em-
pirical application to Spanish household data. Our results suggest that the assumption of
transferable utility is a useful one for a large class of households in our sample. However,
the opposite conclusion applies to other households. Therefore, we tentatively conclude
that the adequacy of the hypothesis depends on the specic household (characteristics) at
hand.
We see dierent avenues for follow-up research. First, from an empirical point of view,
one may use our framework to more thoroughly investigate the specic household charac-
teristics that drive the adequacy of the transferable utility model (e.g. by using data sets
with richer information than the one we studied). We believe this is particularly inter-
esting given the wide use of the transferable utility hypothesis in (theoretical) household
economics. Next, referring to our discussion in Section 2, our framework can be used for
assessing the validity of the transferable utility hypothesis in alternative (non-household)
settings where this assumption crucially underlies important theoretical results.
Finally, to keep our exposition simple, our analysis has concentrated on the character-
ization of transferable utility, and testing consistency of observed behavior with this char-
acterization. If observed behavior is found consistent with a behavioral hypothesis, then
natural next questions involve recovering/identifying the corresponding decision model that
rationalizes the observed consumption behavior, and to forecasting behavior in new situa-
tions. In this respect, it is worth emphasizing that our revealed preference characterization
does allow for subsequent recovery and forecasting analysis. For example, this analysis can
develop along the lines of Varian (1982) and, more recently, Blundell, Browning, and Craw-
ford (2008), who considered such questions in a formally similar revealed preference setting.
In this respect, we recall from our application that the GQL (or transferable utility) test
turns out to be substantially more powerful than the GARP test, which is usually con-
sidered in revealed preference applications. As such, we can expect that using the GQL
17specication (when it cannot be rejected) can eectively produce more vigorous recovery
and forecasting results.
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19Appendix A: proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
(2 ! 3). By convexity of the function (Q) and concavity of the function (q;Q) we must
have that for all observations t;v 2 T:
























. Then, substituting and using the rst order conditions (foc.1)-(foc.3)
demonstrates conditions (RP.1)-(RP.4).
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The function  is convex and  is concave, hence u is quasi-concave. Further, it is
increasing in both q and Q. Finally, using a similar argument as Varian (1982, p.970), we
can derive that (Qt) = t and (qt;Qt) = t for all t 2 T
Given all this, we can prove the result ad absurdum. Suppose that S is not TU-
rationalizable. Then, there must exist an allocation fx;q;Qg such that x + ptq + PtQ <
xt + ptqt + PtQt and u(x;q;Q)  u(xt;qt;Qt) =  ut. We thus get
x + ptq + PtQ   ut(Q)   (q;Q) + ptq + PtQ








(Q   Qt)   pt(q   qt) + ptq + PtQ
= xt + ptqt + PtQt;
which gives the wanted contradiction. (The rst inequality combines u(x;q;Q) = (x/(Q))+
((q;Q)/(Q)) with u(x;q;Q)   ut, the second inequality uses (A.1) and (A.2), and the
nal equality uses (RP.3) and (RP.4).)




(Mqm;Q). Then, for all t 2 T and m  M, we set qm
t = qt/M and
xm
t = xt=M.
Proof of Proposition 2
(1 ! 2) Assume that there exist numbers xt such that fpt;Pt;xt;qt;Qtgt2T is TU-
rationalizable. Then, it follows from Proposition 1 that there exist positive numbers t, t
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v(Qt   Qv) (RP.1)
t   v  pv(qt   qv) + 














Setting, for all t 2 T, t = UB
t , 

t = ~ PB
t and ~ PA
t =  
A
t  ut translates condition (RP.2)
and (RP.3) into conditions (RP.6) and (RP.7). So we only need to demonstrate condition
(RP.5).
Multiplying (RP.1) by minus one, gives:





v (Qt   Qv)
Given this, setting A
t = 1/ ut > 0 and UA
t =  t   minvf vg  0 establishes
condition (RP.5).
(2 ! 1) Assume that there exist numbers UA
t ;UB
t and A
t , and vectors ~ PA
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v (Qt   Qv) (RP.6)
~ P
A
t + ~ P
B
t = Pt (RP.7)
First, by setting, for all t 2 T, t = UB
t , 

t = ~ PB
t , we derive (RP.2).
Next, we dene  ut = 1

A
t and ~ PA
t
.
 ut =  

t . Substitution in condition (RP.7) gives
condition (RP.3).





v )  

t (Qt   Qv) (A.3)
As  ut > 0, there exist a number  > 0 such that  ut >  for all t 2 T. Now, consider
a number z 2 R++ and dene t such that (i) t   UA
t + z > 0 (8t 2 T) and (ii)
210 < t/t  . These conditions can be guaranteed by taking z large enough. Using this
denition of t in condition (A.3) above gives condition (RP.1).
Finally, we dene xt such that
xt  t ut   t > 0;
which obtains condition (RP.4).
Proof of Proposition 3
This result uses the equivalence of (RP.5) and GARP; this is stated more formally in
Theorem 1 below. Next, in the main text we argued that (IP.3)-(IP.5) do allow for verifying
GARP for our setting.
Appendix B: Afriat's Theorem
In the main text, we make use of Afriat's Theorem. This result was stated by Varian
(1982) and is based on the original work of Afriat (1967). It is probably the single most
important theorem in the revealed preference literature. To facilitate our exposition in the
main text, we briey recapture the result here. We refer to Varian (1982) for more a more
detailed discussion.
Let us consider a general setting with a price-quantity set Z as introduced in Section 5
of the main text. We consider the following rationalizability concept:
Denition 3 (U-rationalizable) The set Z = fwl;xlgl2L, with wl 2 RK
++ and xl 2 RK
+,
is utility (U)-rationalizable if there exist a non-satiated utility function u such that each
quantity bundle xl maximizes the function u in the following sense: xl 2 argmaxx u(x)
s:t: wlx  wlxl.
We can now state Afriat's Theorem.
Theorem 1 (Afriat's Theorem) Consider a set Z = fwl;xlgl2L with wl 2 RK
++ and
xl 2 RK
+. The following conditions are equivalent:
1. The set Z is U-rationalizable;
2. The set Z satises GARP;
3. For all l 2 L, there exist Ul 2 R+ and l 2 R++ such that, for all l;k 2 L :
Ul   Uk  kwk(xl   xk);
4. There exist a strictly increasing, continuous and concave utility function that provides
a rationalization for Z.
22In Section 5 of our main text, we use two important implications of this result. First,
the equivalence between statements 1 (or 4) and 3 implies that a price-quantity set Z is
U-rationalizable by some utility function if and only if it is consistent with GARP. Second,
the equivalence between statements 2 and 3 means that the set Z is consistent with GARP
if and only if it satises a number of inequalities dened in the unknowns Ul and l. These
last inequalities are commonly referred to as `Afriat inequalities' corresponding to the set
Z. Intuitively, these Afriat inequalities allow us to obtain estimates for the utility levels
(Ut) and marginal utilities (t) attained at each l whenever the set Z is rationalizable.
23